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ABSTRACT 
We construct a general equilibrium model and analyze the effectiveness of trade reform 
in a distorted economy where distortion exists in form of bureaucratic corruption that 
arises because of trade protection at the border. In this kleptocratic set up, intermediaries 
are employed in order to run off from paying a part of import tariff. We use HOSV kind 
of framework to prove that whether trade liberalization necessarily helps reducing 
corruption activities and to check what happens to the production of commodities.  
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Trade Reform in a Corrupt Economy - A Note 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The debate over free-trade versus restricted-trade dates back to the origin of 
economic science itself. It still remains a pulsating area of research since sometimes trade 
reform ends up with undesired or counterintuitive outcome. Historically, almost all 
countries have implemented restrictive trade polices at some points in their history. What 
the supporters of protectionist policies claim, barring imported goods will save jobs, 
providing domestic industries to recuperate and prosper and trim down trade deficits. 
However, the associated costs of protectionism are less money for buying other things; 
price of goods increases unnecessarily; forces us to pay more taxes directly and indirectly 
as government recruits more bureaucrats who need to be paid. Therefore, trade protection 
more often than not hurts the protecting country is one of the oldest but still most 
astounding insights (Bhagwati, 1988). Nevertheless, one might call attention to two 
situations where protection can raise welfare. One is when country is capable of using the 
threat of protection to reduce the protection against its exports. Other is when a country 
has monopoly power over a good (Helpman and Krugman, 1989). 
One significant distinctiveness of recent economic environment has been the 
extent of trade liberalization in developing countries. The reason is the conviction: 
liberalization is conductive for growth (Dixon, 1998). Protection has declined 
considerably over the past three decades. Some deserving references are Krueger (1998), 
Anderson and Wincoop (2001), Greenaway et al (1998), Wacziarg and Welch (2003) etc. 
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Furthermore, in a very recent Oxford University Press volume Marjit (2008) has provided 
some pertinent theoretical papers on protectionism and liberalization issues.   
In this paper we try to explore the effectiveness of trade policy reform in a 
competitive but corruption affected economy. Essentially our paper is a case of multiple 
distortions, unlike Bhagwati’s case (Bhagwati, 1988) of immiserizing growth. The 
conventional belief regarding economic reform and liberalization per se is that it helps 
reforming nations to specialize according to comparative advantage and procuring 
relatively dearer commodities from others. At the same time it facilitates reducing 
bureaucratic complications related corruption at the borders. This implies, a reduction in 
tariff should not only push the economy towards “free trade”, it should also reduce the 
degree of distortion, if not the absolute amount, in the corrupt sector which is a by-
product of trade restriction. We start from this benign conventional wisdom and try to 
posit an interesting theoretical issue. In our work lessening protection contracts the input 
producing sector and hence frees up some labor. These freed labor along with those 
unshackled from corrupt sector flow out and should help augmenting labor-intensive 
commodity production and contracting the capital-intensive one. However, it is very 
much possible that size of the corruption sector may, in fact, go up in spite of a reduction 
in the degree of protection which is presumably responsible for intermediation related 
corrupt practices. Here it is important to note that we are not trying to model corruption 
in our paper, rather our endeavour is to theorize the effectiveness of trade reform in 
presence of tariff related corruption. 
In section 2 we describe the model with intuitive solutions and basic results. Last 
section provides some concluding remarks.  
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2. The Model and Basic Results 
Home economy is considered to be a perfectly competitive small country 
producing two tradeable goods, capital-intensive good X and labor-intensive good Y and 
there is another sector which produces intermediate input M.  Production of M requires 
labor and a specific factor, land. Hence Y is the exportable and X is the importable for a 
labor-abundant economy. Production of Y requires capital, labor and the intermediate 
input, M. Producers have two sources for M.  One is domestic market and the other is 
international market where the price is internationally determined and given. This 
intermediate input is subject to tariff. However, M can also be procured from the 
domestic market but domestic supply is insufficient. Note that intermediate input is 
relatively cheaper in international market. In order to protect the domestic intermediate 
input industry government imposes a tariff on the imports of M. Hence, domestic price of 
M is exactly equal to the tariff inclusive price of imported M. Producers of Y needs to 
either pay tariff and or pay tariff inclusive price so that the effective price is same in both 
the cases. However, no producer is willing to pay honestly as this may result in some 
form of incentive such as an increase in the factor return(s). Thus our economy is 
characterized by kleptocracy. The amount of advalorem tariff associated with import is t. 
Producers pay β fraction of t of which a part goes to government coffer and other part 
goes to the custom officers as premium over their stipulated salary. Despite the fact that 
the second part does not constitute tariff revenue, this payment is made by the importers. 
To them it does not matter where it goes. Therefore, we consider it as part of cost of 
production. Nevertheless, for doing this intermediation a fraction, how much small it may 
  5
be, of labor force need to be employed. Though a major chunk of the total labor force is 
absorbed in the production of X, Y and M, but others get employment due to institutional 
complexities involved in import. These institutional complexities give rise to corruption 
activity represented by sector Z. Let us assume, Lz laborers are used to solve these 
complexities. This service is not free of cost. We assume competitive market for 
corruption to be consistent with the otherwise standard specifications of the competitive 
general equilibrium model. Note that the structure of our model has some resemblance 
with Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) nugget (Jones and Marjit, 1992), where there is a 
complementarity in production among commodities. In that sense it is an amalgamation 
of H-O and specific factor model of trade. 
Perfect competition prevails in all markets and production functions for X, Y and 
M are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to factor 
inputs. 
The symbols and basic equations are in tune with Jones (1965, 1971). In this 
paper we intimately follow the framework used by Marjit and Mandal (2008).  
To build the system of equations, we need to use the following notations: 
Pi = Price of ith good, i = X, Y, M   
w = Return to labor 
r = Return to capital, K 
R = Return to land, T 
ija = Technological co-efficient 
K  = Total supply of capital 
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L  = Total supply of labor 
T = Total supply of land 
Lz = Labor engaged in corruption activities 
t = amount of advalorem tariff on import of M 
Therefore, the general equilibrium structure is like the following one: 
           
( ) zM wLMtP =− **1 .β                                                       (1) 
Where, 0<β<1, and YMYa . - MS=M*, which is essentially the demand-supply equilibrium 
for intermediate input. Here, M* implies imported input and MS stands for domestic 
production. 
Note that one may effortlessly disagree if ( ) **1 .MtP Mβ−  is not greater than the 
spending for doing intermediation, then why should one be corrupt. The point is, if this is 
the case, the corruption sector would be able to produce supernormal profit and more 
producers will also be instigated to do with this dishonest process. But this is not the way 
how factual world works. On the other hand when wLz > ( ) **1 .MtP Mβ− , no producer 
will find it economical or even rational to be involved in this sort of intermediation. 
Moreover, under this circumstances labor will flock into corruption sector and hence the 
viability of the economy will be at stake. In both the above cases the main essence of 
competitive framework is lost. Therefore, the only condition consistent with competitive 
general equilibrium framework is what we have written in (1). On the other hand, for the 
survival of domestic input producing sector this equality has to hold good. Precisely that 
is why the cost of procuring intermediate input either from domestic or international 
market is the same. However, one could have thought of a punishment cost or anticipated 
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punishment cost associated with bureaucratic intermediation, if we had tried to model 
corruption. But that is not our focus here.                                                                                                                                                                                           
Competitive price conditions imply: 
              XParaw KXLX =+ ..             (2) 
YMYMM PtPtParaw aKYLY =−++++ ])1(*)1(*[. .. ββ      
Or, YMYM PtParaw aKYLY =+++ )1(*. ..                                      (3) 
Though importers of M are paying only β fraction of tariff t, they have spent out 
the entire saved amount for intermediation. Thus, whatever be the source of input, 
domestic or international, cost be the same and it would be )1(* . tP M + . Hence, 
  )1(* . tPRw MTMLM aa +=+           (4)  
Implications of full employment conditions are: 
 
... LMLYLX aYaXa ++ M   L            (5) 
KYaXa KYKX =+ ..              (6) 
	
.                         (7)  
This completes the structure of our model. Now for given β, PX, PY and t we can 
determine the values of w, r and R from (2), (3) and (4) since P*M is given from the 
international market. Hence all s are determined through CRS assumption from w, r 
and R. Since T is fixed MS is calculated from (7). Presence of tariff implies positive 
amount of Lz to start with. Let us assume any Lz such that Lz>0 and ( ) 0>− LzL . Thus 
for TKL ,,  and a given Lz, we can solve for X, Y and domestically produced MS from 
(5), (6) and (7). Note that for any given positive t and w, r, Y we can easily solve for Lz 
from equation (1). RHS of (1) is increasing in Lz as w is already determined. As Lz goes 
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up Y should fall due to the factor intensity assumption. Therefore demand for 
intermediate input, MD (= YMYa . ) falls keeping domestic supply constant at a level 
determined from (7). Therefore, LHS of (1) must be a decreasing function of Lz. This is 
portrayed in figure -1. 
2.1. Reform and Outputs 
Differentiating equation (2) and (3) and assuming P*M, aMY as constant and setting 
0ˆˆ == YX PP
 
we get (a circumflex on a variable is used to denote the proportional 
change), 
        ∆=
θ
θKXt
w
ˆ
ˆ
             (8) 
and ∆−=
θ
θLXt
r
.ˆ)(ˆ                         (9) 
Where,   ⇒jiθ  value share of j in ith commodity, i = X, Y; j = L, K, M 
 and ||          0   and ∆  =
Y
MYM
P
tP a .*
      
 
From equation (4), substituting wˆ  we get, 
 
TM
LMKX
TMM
M t
tP
P
tR
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
ˆ1
)1(*
*
ˆˆ
∆
−
+
=
         (10) 
Note that 0<θ  since X is assumed to be capital-intensive. 
Thus consequent upon trade liberalization  0ˆ >w  and 0ˆ <r
 and 0ˆ <R , since 
0ˆ <t and 0. and 0 >∆<θ
 
 
For given β, PX and PY if t falls w increases and r falls because return to the 
intensive factor in the production of Y should rise and that of X should fall following 
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Stolper-Samuelson argument. A closer look at equation (4) reveals RHS falls owing to a 
decrease in t and w has already risen from (2) and (3). Therefore R should definitely fall. 
This result is quite obvious since T is specific to M while labor is the mobile factor. 
However, the value of Rˆ essentially depends on the value share of other factors. We have 
shown it in (10).  Hence 
r
w
 and 
R
w
changes and consequent upon this there will be 
changes in the input requirement of production because everyone tries to minimize cost 
of production. So, aij s will be altered. 
Note that in our system of equations all X, Y, MS and Lz are interdependent. This 
interdependence forces us to simultaneously solve the equilibrium values of these 
variables. 
Totally differentiating the full employment conditions and equation (1) we get, 
     ! 
  "!"  #   #   
# 
       (11) 
     #   #            (12) 
  
$
%  ! 
&
%  "!  '̂  )*         (13) 
! 	
  	
# 	
                     (14) 
    Using the zero profit conditions and the concept of elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital in X and Y and between labor and land in M and manipulating 
(11) through (14) we have, 
     ! 
  "!"  
+
 ,)*  -.	
  )*  /̂0       (15) 
     )*  /̂0            (16) 
  
$
%  ! 
&
%  "!  )*  '̂        (17) 
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! 	
  	
+
 ,)*  -.
                    (18) 
where, [ ]KYLYYKXLXXL θλθλδ σσ += ,  [ ]LYKYYLXKXXK θλθλδ σσ +=  
and  Xσ =
rw
LXKX aa
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
−
−
, Yσ =
rw
LYKY aa
ˆˆ
ˆˆ
−
−
, Mσ =
Rw
LMTM aa
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ
−
−
, TMaM ˆ)(ˆ −=
 
In matrix form we can represent the equations as follows: 
1
23
  
 "    0 000 
4 %50
  %5 1	
 0
  
7
89 : 
 !"! ; = 12
3
+
 ,)*  -.	
  )*  /̂0  )*  /̂0)*  '̂ 	
+
 ,)*  -.
 78
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Using the Cramer’s rule we can solve for ,  , !  and "!. 
 = =|>| ?	
+
 ,)*  -. @
  "
 
&
%A  	
)*  /̂ @ 0  " 
$
% 0 
               0A   	
")*  '̂ B           (19) 
Note that, |C|   	
 ?
$
% "    B;  |C|  0 as we assumed X to 
be capital intensive i.e, DEFDGF H DEIDGI . 
If  DGJDGK H 
 
&
%   ,  must be negative. 
       This result is quite conventional as reduction in trade restriction leads to contraction 
of domestic importable production. However, it should be carefully looked at that X is 
never distorted by tariff. Conventional wisdom states a decrease in output subsequent 
upon reform if that is beset with tariff. If the above condition is not satisfied, X output 
might even increase due to reform depending upon the relative strength of negative and 
positive effects. 
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 Economic argument is very simple. Due to a tariff slash w goes up whereas r falls 
leading to more binding capital-constraint and less binding labor-constraint which must 
result in X to fall and Y to rise (we shall check if it happens here!). Following this 
argument we can propose that, 
PROPOSITION I: The conventional output effect on importable production is not 
compelling in a corrupt economy. The sufficient condition for X to fall should read as  
DGJDGK H 
 
&
%  . 
 
What is going to happen to the output of Y that is also very interesting because 
what traditional argument emphasizes is an increase but that is true only for a so-called 
fair economy. In our model change in Y is symbolized as follows: 
 = =|>| ?	
+
 ,)*  -. @"
 
&
%  
A  	
)*  /̂L 0   0M 
                     	
")*  '̂ B            (20) 
Under the same condition for which    0, first term within the third bracket of 
the RHS of (20) is negative, second term is negative while only the third one is positive. 
Therefore the eventual effect on Y is not unambiguous.   N 0 iff  
O+
 ,)*  -. P"
 %  
Q  )*  /̂L 0   0MO   
N | 	
")*  '̂ | 
Ambiguity in Y comes from the nature of production function as it also requires a 
tradeable intermediate input, M apart from labor and capital. 
PROPOSITION II: Even if the production of importable falls exportable output may not 
increase. 
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Now we shall turn to check the effect on domestic importable production. 
!  =|>| ?	
+
 ,)*  -.
 @
$
%    AB    (21) 
When X happens to be the capital intensive !  is unambiguously negative. This outcome 
goes with the conventional wisdom. However what would happen to the actual import of 
intermediate input, M* that is not clear yet because of ambiguity in the effect on Y. 
Nonetheless, if Y goes up and MS falls, M* should invariably increase. We will come to 
this issue later. 
 Effect on the size of corruption sector is also ambiguous. Positive effect on Lz 
comes from the import demand for input whereas the negative effect is generated through 
reduction in tariff. That is why we need to check as to which effect dominates what. This 
claim can be corroborated further by the following expression: 
 "!  =|>| ?	
)*  /̂ 
$
% L0  0M  	
   )*  '̂  
             	
+
 ,)*  -.
  @2 
$
%   
  
&
%    A  B      (22) 
Hence, "! N 0 iff 
O)*  /̂ 4% L0  0M  +
 ,)*  -.
  P2 4%  
  %    QO
N |   )*  '̂ | 
Note that a fall in Lz imply an increase in Y production and a fall in X production 
following Rybczynski effect. On the other hand the implication of an increase in Lz is 
that labor will go out of productive sector affecting most the labor-intensive commodity 
Y. Thus production of Y will decrease and that of X will rise.  
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 Now the question is what actually happens to the relative size and value share of 
corruption activities due to tariff slash? The size of the corruption sector is defined by: 
TRKrLw
wLz
++
 = 
T
w
RK
w
rL
Lz
++
          (23)  
As t falls all terms in the denominator goes down except L . Thus if Lz remains 
constant or increases, the size of the corruption sector must increase. When Lz falls 
corruption activity may even increase if the denominator falls faster than the numerator. 
Thus the following proposition is immediate: 
Proposition III:     The size of intermediation related corrupt activity certainly increases 
even when the trade restriction at the border is reduced, on the condition that: 
O)*  /̂ 4% L0  0M  +
 ,)*  -.
  P2 4%  
  %    QO
S |   )*  '̂ | 
           QED 
 This expression is a bit complicated. However, the economic intuition behind this 
outcome can easily be interpreted from (13). It can be rewritten as,    
"!      
$
%  ! 
&
%  '̂  )*    
An increase in w leads to a fall in Lz because productive employment goes up and as 
protection at the borders reduces through a fall in t, requirement for intermediators, Lz 
falls. On the other side of the story, as domestic supply of MS decreases, it leads to an 
increase in import and hence Lz. And also note that the ambiguity in Y makes the 
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consequential effect on Lz uncertain. Here it is important to note that this analysis must 
fail if t goes down to zero since that will totally eliminate the corrupt activity.  
 Now lets go back to the effect on actual import, M*. We know that YMYa . - 
MS=M*. Therefore, %!    
$
%  ! 
&
%        (24) 
We already know that under certain condition !  0 and this is likely to hold true. 
However the effect on Y is not certain. In this circumstance if Y goes up actual import of 
input must rise due to tariff cut. The underlying argument is not tough to tackle with. Y is 
exportable and it’s production requires the intermediate input. When Y rises the demand 
for input must rise. Coupled with this as domestic production of input decreases, import 
of intermediate input must go up. Nevertheless when Y falls we need to weigh as to 
whether the negative effect on M* because of lower demand is greater or less than the 
positive effect on M* due to lower domestic supply. Therefore we may write the 
following proposition: 
  Proposition IV:     Liberalization may not lead to a rise in the import of intermediate 
input. It may even decrease in a corruption ridden economy.  
 
2.2. Welfare Implications 
However, the welfare implications of trade reform in a corrupt economy is 
something straightforward but quite interesting. The standard welfare measure at a given 
world price is denoted by: 
 PX*XD+ PY*YD= PX*X+ PY*Y- PM*M*(1+t) + PM*M*t 
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Here D stands for consumption demand and we should not include PM  and M separately 
as it is already included in PY. Further it is important to note that, in our model β fraction 
of tariff actually goes to government’s coffer and to customs officers as bribe whereas the 
remaining fraction (1-β) is spent out for intermediaries. It does not matter where it is 
going as long as this constitutes a part of total consumption demand from domestic 
nationals. Therefore, given the endowments of all factors of production setting, P*Y as 
the numeraire we can express change in welfare as  
TΩ  V % T4  T 4 
Therefore,                                  WΩWX  V% WWX  WWX  V
% W
%WX  
Using  (24)           WΩWX  V% WWX  WWX  V
% Y Z   [\!   \ WX ] 
 Since t falls, an increase in welfare means TΩ T'5  0. The change in generated 
demand for M coming from Y and that of supply of M from domestic sector is captured 
by dM*, change in total import demand that actually implies a leakage. This leakage is 
not for original importable commodity, X but to produce more of exportable Y. This is 
precisely why an augmentation in welfare is simultaneously countered by this import 
expenditure. When t decreases X falls along with MS. However,     may take any value. 
In both the situations welfare effect is unclear. 
When  >0 :  WΩWX ^ 0 iff _WWX    V
% Y Z   [\!   \ WX ]_ N `V% WWX ` 
And  
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When  <0 :  WΩWX ^ 0 iff `V
%  Z   [ WX ` N _V% WWX  WWX  V
% \!   \ WX _ 
 
3. Conclusion 
We developed a simple trade model for a small open economy producing three 
goods out of which one commodity is used as the intermediate input in the export 
producing sector and the rest one is importable. However, intermediate input can also be 
imported. Importation of intermediate input is beset with tariff. Hence, the inherent 
tendency of the producer is to get rid of this extra payment. Thus they employ people to 
work for intermediation between custom officials and producers. That is how corruption 
enters into the framework. A reduction in tariff conventionally reduces the domestic 
production of input and also the production of importable final good. However, the effect 
on imported intermediate input using exportable final commodity and actual import of 
input are ambiguous. As corruption is associated with tariff restriction, a fall in tariff 
should reduce corrupt practice. But this may not be the case under certain condition. In 
this paper we derived the precise condition and focused on the mechanism for this 
unconventional outcome. Moreover in the welfare front the implication is very much 
uncertain. 
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Determination of equilibrium Lz  for given Prices and tariff 
 
 
 
